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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 In the early days of the Cold War, the United States, faced with the need to protect 
its long northern border against the prospect of Soviet long-range bombers equipped with 
nuclear weapons, built a chain of radar stations, called the Distant Early Warning (DEW) 
Line, along the northern coast of North America.  Consisting of sixty-three stations 
positioned along the Alaskan and Canadian Arctic, the DEW Line stood watch along the 
northern reaches of North America from nuclear bombers, seeking to backstop U.S. nuclear 
forces against a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack by the Soviet Union. 
 The demanding tasks and remote location of the DEW Line meant that solutions to 
considerable technological problems had to be found in order to make the chain of radar 
stations a reality.  These technological hurdles included automatic signal processing to 
reduce manpower requirements, secure and reliable communications system to connect 
the DEW Line with the air defense and nuclear command and control systems of the United 
States and Canada, and the logistical difficulties of building and maintaining such a large 
system in the remote Arctic wilderness.  The exceptional technological sophistication and 
construction difficulties of the DEW Line place it in the pantheon of Cold War technological 
systems.   
But while the DEW Line and its supporting systems were considerable feats of 
technology, these accomplishments obscured a flawed implementation of the original 
design concept and embodied the evolving U.S. concept of nuclear deterrence.  The 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group, which 
consisted of people from academia, industry and the armed forces and whose 1952 report 
on U.S. and Canadian air defenses initiated the construction of the DEW Line, understood 
very clearly the difficulties of defending North America against nuclear-armed Soviet 
bombers.  However, the Study Group’s proposal was not fully implemented by the U.S., 
and the truncated design that was built sacrificed the effectiveness of continental air 
defenses in favor of a tripwire system meant to trigger a nuclear retaliatory response.  In 
this way, the DEW Line embodied both the logic and the rhetoric of Massive Retaliation. 
  The result of this flawed conceptual foundation and the limits of the technologies 
involved meant the DEW Line never fulfilled both the early warning and air defense roles 
its designers envisioned.  But as understanding of its limitations grew, the role of the DEW 
Line evolved from a tripwire into one of a number of overlapping detection systems that 
constituted the nation’s early warning systems.  Their continued operation throughout the 
Cold War to this very day demonstrates the continued utility and success of these systems. 
 Despite its size, cost and significance, the DEW Line has been the subject of only 
limited scholarly examination.  Two United States Air Force publications, Kenneth Schaffel’s 
The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960 
and David F. Winkler’s Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War 
Defense Radar Program both devote a few pages to the history of the DEW Line, and both 
examine development and implementation of the DEW Line.  Although Winkler’s work 
looks at component technologies of the DEW Line, neither Winkler or Schaffel discusses 
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the DEW Line’s capabilities as a technological system and how it fit into other such systems 
that made up North American continental air defenses.  Joseph T. Jockel’s No Boundaries 
Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defenses 
discusses continental air defenses in the context of a thorough examination of the U.S.-
Canadian defense relationship.  The most thorough scholarly work on the DEW Line is 
James Louis Isemann’s dissertation entitled To Detect, to Deter, to Defend: The Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line and Early Cold War Defense Policy, 1953-1957.  Isemann 
examines the origins of the DEW Line from early concepts of strategic bombing and air 
defense to the final implementation of the DEW Line in 1957.  Although an excellent work 
in many regards, Isemann argues that the DEW Line improved both the U.S. nuclear 
retaliatory capability and continental air defenses.  This paper respectfully disagrees and 
argues instead that the DEW Line was a flawed implementation of the Summer Study 
Group’s original concept and that, although it and other systems enhanced U.S. early 
warning capabilities, the DEW Line did not significantly improve continental air defenses. 
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Chapter 2.  The Air Defense Lessons of the Second World War 
The U.S. and its allies gained extensive experience in air defense during World War 
Two, and they developed sophisticated air defense systems to defend against air attacks on 
land and at sea.  While individual technologies like radar played an important role in these 
defenses, these technologies were only a part of larger system of air defense.  The ability to 
quickly gather, process, and disseminate information about incoming enemy air raids, and 
effectively allocate defensive weapon systems based on that information, proved crucial to 
the success of any air defense. 
The successful defense of British airspace during the Battle of Britain is perhaps the 
most famous example of a successful air defense system.  The Chain Home system of air 
defense radars is often cited as the key to the British victory over the German Luftwaffe.  
However, these radars were only a component of a larger air defense system that allowed 
Fighter Command to maximize the effectiveness of its aircraft.  Raw information from the 
radars was fed into a raid reporting system that fused it with information from other 
sources, including ground spotters and signals intelligence.  The processed information 
from these “filter rooms” would be integrated on large map table displays at regional 
command centers where local commanders could allocate air defense assets in the most 
effective manner.1  This system is also notable because of the large geographic area that 
had to be defended and the myriad number of scattered air defense forces that had to be 
                                                          
1 David Zimmerman, Britain's Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe, (Stroud: Sutton, 2001), 160-
61,173-174, 208-210.; Norman Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter 
through Three World Wars, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 51-52. 
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coordinated.  Even so, Britain’s air defenses operated on the same principle of effective 
data fusion and dissemination and control of interception employed by the U.S. Navy in the 
Pacific. 
 The U.S. Navy employed a similar concept during World War Two, and the Pacific 
Theater provided U.S. Navy with extensive experience in managing air battles.  Historian 
Norman Friedman argues that the key to American success was picture-centric warfare—
that is, the ability to gather and process incoming tactical information into a cohesive 
tactical picture and effectively disseminate that picture to appropriate end users.  Although 
radar and other sensing technologies (including the human eyeball) could provide a wealth 
of tactical information, the sheer amount of that information could quickly overwhelm the 
ability of tactical commanders to use it effectively unless it was processed into a form that 
was easily understandable.  This data then had to be shared appropriately before it could 
be effectively used.  The solution was the Combat Information Center—a shipboard data 
fusion center that enabled incoming information from sensors and spotters to be quickly 
processed and shared via a visual display of the tactical situation.  This tactical picture 
could then be used by the relevant commanders to direct aircraft, ship-borne guns and 
other weapons in a way that maximized their effectiveness.2 
 The success of both the British and the U.S. Navy in managing their respective air 
defense battles provided a useful model for U.S. post-war defense planners.  However, the 
development of jet aircraft and nuclear weapons raised both the tempo and the stakes of 
                                                          
2
 Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare, 57-61. 
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an air defense battle.  The U.S. would struggle for the next fifteen years to adapt the 
wartime model to new conditions in the effort to create effective continental air defenses. 
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Chapter 3.  The Origins of Continental Air Defense 
Bomber generals who believed strategic bombing won the Second World War and 
would be the key to winning the next conflict dominated the postwar Air Force.  These 
generals increasingly viewed continental air defense as merely an adjunct to strategic 
bombing, which was the ultimate guarantor of U.S. national security.  The air defense 
system that emerged from this logic had one primary objective: to serve as a tripwire 
activating a U.S. nuclear retaliation, thereby preventing the destruction of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent, i.e. the bombers of Strategic Air Command. 
In addition to dominating the planning process for nuclear bombing, the Air Force 
also dominated planning for the defense against nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.  This 
role was in part due to geography, since the shortest route between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was across the Arctic, where neither the Army nor Navy could operate 
well.3  Although there was general agreement among U.S. military and civilian intelligence 
agencies that the Soviets would not have nuclear capability until 1952, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff recognized as early as the autumn of 1945 that the most likely routes of any U.S. or 
Soviet attacks on each other would be over the North Atlantic and polar region.4 
The U.S. was slow to develop a program of air defense in the period immediately 
after the Second World War.  The national experience of the United States had not 
                                                          
3 David R. Mets, "Technology, Thought, Troops: General Carl Spaatz and the Dawn of the Nuclear Age," in 
David R. Mets and William P. Head,  Plotting a True Course: Reflections of USAF Strategic Attack Theory and 
Doctrine: the Post-World War II Experience, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 22-23. 
4
 Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: the Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-60, 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1991), 57-58. 
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prepared the country for the possibility of an attack on the United States with a nuclear 
weapon.   Likewise, there had previously been no reason for the U.S. to make radical 
changes in defense or foreign policy based on developments in weapon technology.5  
General Henry “Hap” Arnold, the head of U.S. Army Air Forces during World War Two, 
stated in 1945 that the Soviet Union was not a threat in part because the primitive state of 
Soviet technology was not capable of posing a threat to the United States.  Arnold’s belief 
reflected the widely held view of postwar planners that the Soviet Union required decades 
to acquire the sophistication required to mount an air attack of the U.S. homeland, and 
only then would the Soviet Union be a serious threat to the United States.6  But by the late 
1940s, the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs believed that Soviet Union had numerous 
bombers that could reach cities in the U.S. and Canada from bases in Siberia.  Nuclear 
armament meant that those cities could be destroyed in such an attack.  For the first time, 
both the U.S. and Canada had to seriously plan for the air defense of North America.7   
In 1947, the U.S. concern about the state of air defense grew after the Soviet Union 
showed off its copy of the B-29, known as the Tu-4.  These planes were thought to be able 
to bomb all of the U.S. on one-way missions.  Concern grew in 1948 when Pentagon 
planners estimated that the Soviets had 200 Tu-4s and would have as many as 1,000 
                                                          
5
 Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith, From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense 
Computer,  (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000), 6. 
6 Perry M. Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1941-1945, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 81-82. 
7
 Robert Bothwell,  Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 
116.; JCS 2084/15, First Interim Report on the Evaluation of Air Defense Weapons and Weapon Systems, 
Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic File 1951-1953, RG 218, Box 56, National Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland. 
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sometime by 1949.8  Early warning of Soviet air raids was also required to ensure that 
Strategic Air Command and the nuclear retaliatory capability it constituted was not 
eliminated in a surprise attack; if that capability was destroyed, the West would probably 
have no option other than to surrender.  In this context, North America could be seen as a 
strategic unity, since whether Soviet bombers attacking North America over polar routes 
were targeting the U.S. or Canada did not matter for planning purposes.9 
 In October 1948, the Joint Chiefs approved an interim radar system appropriately 
known as “Lashup”. Composed entirely of World War Two-vintage radars, Lashup provided 
only limited coverage over areas of the country considered absolutely essential to defend 
against air attack during the event of a war.  This area included the population centers of 
the Northeast (including Washington, D.C.) Southern California, the industrial areas of 
Great Lakes region, and the nuclear facilities in Washington State, New Mexico and Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee.  The name of the system was changed to “Permanent” after legislation 
authorizing expanding the system was passed by Congress in February 1949.10 
                                                          
8 Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air 
Defense, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 31-32. 
9
 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 116. 
10
 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 34. 
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Figure 1 Map of Lashup System Radar Sites, April 1950 (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/1997-06-
01955.pdf) 
 Although Lashup and the Permanent system greatly expanded the radar coverage 
of the continental United States, this expansion was not matched by increased 
sophistication of the command and control portion of the air defense system on the order 
required by the development of long-range jet bombers.  While a ground-controlled 
intercept capability existed with both systems11, both the Lashup and Permanent systems 
lacked the ability to coordinate air defenses effectively against large raids, especially under 
conditions of a surprise attack. However, U.S. defense planners regarded the Permanent 
System as an adequate response to a Soviet threat that was not yet in possession of 
                                                          
11
 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 210. 
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nuclear weapons.  The purpose of the system was to limit damage from conventional 
attacks through gradual attrition Soviet bombers while the U.S. initiated its nuclear 
response.  The limitations of this strategy underpinning the Permanent line began to show 
themselves after the Soviet detonated their first atomic bomb in 1949.
 
 
Figure 2 Map of Permanent System Radar Sites, June 1952 (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/1997-06-
01955.pdf) 
 
  Although the United States had certainly improved its early warning radar system in 
the closing years of the 1940s, it was still a long way from having anything close to a 
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comprehensive air defense system.  The inadequacy of this system was the subject of a 
December 1950 report of the Weapon Studies and Evaluation Group (WSEG).  The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff requested the report, entitled “First Interim Report on the Evaluation of Air 
Defense Weapons and Weapons Systems,” three days after the Soviet Union detonated 
their first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949.  Its conclusions were alarming.  The WSEG 
assumed that the Soviet Union would only have about thirty atomic bombs available for a 
strike against the United States, and that only half of those bombs would be used in a first 
strike.  If such a Soviet air strike was carried out using Tu-4 bombers12 against the U.S. 
without warning and during daylight hours, the WSEG estimated that U.S. air defenses 
would be unable to stop a single bomber from delivering its payload.  Given two hours of 
warning, air defense forces might be able to stop as many as half of the Soviet bombers, 
but only in daylight and good weather conditions. A similar strike carried out at night or 
during bad weather could expect a 85-100% success rate.13 
 The WSEG report stated that the chief reasons behind these finding were a 
complete inadequacy of early warning and surveillance radars and the inability to control 
the ongoing air battle.  The models that the WSEG used in its estimates assumed that the 
Soviet strike would only include nuclear-armed bombers and not long-range fighter escorts 
or electronic countermeasure aircraft.  However, the U.S. air defense system wouldn’t even 
be able to handle an unsupported strike.  The root of the problem was the inability of the 
                                                          
12
 WSEG assumed the aircraft shared thae same features and characteristics.  
13
 JCS 2084/15, First Interim Report on the Evaluation of Air Defense Weapons and Weapon Systems, Page 92, 
Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic File 1951-1953, RG 218, Box 56, National Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland. 
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U.S. to distinguish enemy aircraft from friendly military and civil air traffic.  The chief 
advantage of a few hours warning was that it allowed U.S. authorities to clear the airspace 
of civilian and unnecessary military aircraft, the sheer number of which would likely 
overwhelm the ability of U.S. radar operators to discern friend from foe under normal 
conditions.  Although this would greatly simplify the identification and tracking capabilities 
of the air control and warning system, WSEG projections indicated that only two out of the 
fifteen Soviet bombers would be destroyed before they delivered their payload.14 
 In many ways, the WSEG report was a statement of the basic problem facing the 
U.S. in the age of nuclear-armed intercontinental bombers.  Incremental increases in the 
existing radar and interception control were simply not adequate to the task of defending 
U.S. airspace.  A true solution to this dilemma would require a much more radical solution 
than had yet been offered. 
  
                                                          
14
 Ibid., 96-98. 
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Chapter 4.  NSC-68 
 The U.S. had already begun to lay the foundations of such a solution by the time the 
WSEG report was issued on December 27, 1950.  These changes represented the early 
stages of the U.S. response to several events that occurred between 1949 and 1953.  The 
first of these was the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, followed 
that October by a communist victory in China.  The following year marked the invasion of 
South Korea by the communist North Koreans.  Finally, the Soviet Union detonated a 
thermonuclear bomb in August 1953.  Included in the broad U.S. response to these 
developments were three formative documents of American air defense efforts: National 
Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), the Final Report of Project Charles, and the 1952 
Summer Study Group Report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln 
Laboratory.  These documents were the origin of the mature form of the U.S. continental 
air defenses before the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile. 
  In April 1950, the National Security Council issued the results of a broad re-
evaluation of U.S. national security policy in light of recent actions by the Soviet Union and 
other communist states.  Based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was determined 
to defeat the United States, this report, known as NSC-68, advocated increased military 
capabilities to defend the free world by force, if necessary.   
The lingering fear of a Pearl Harbor-style attack runs throughout the section of NSC-
68 that concerned nuclear capabilities, and the perceived need to defend against such an 
15 
 
 
 
attack resulted in NSC-68’s air defense recommendations.  Although NSC-68 stated that the 
deterrent shield provided by the U.S. nuclear stockpile was then adequate, this deterrent 
would only be effective until the Soviet Union had a comparable nuclear capability.  At that 
point, there would be a possibility for the Soviet Union to destroy existing U.S. nuclear and 
conventional military strength in a surprise attack.15  In response to such a threat, NSC-68 
recommended “greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and… a civil defense 
program which has been thoroughly integrated with military defense systems.”16  These 
recommendations were adopted along with the rest of NSC-68. 
  
                                                          
15
 “A Report to the National Security Council- NSC 68”, April 12, 1950. President’s Secretary’s File, Truman 
Library. 
16
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 6.  Project Charles 
Although NSC-68 established the policy basis for expanded continental air defenses, 
it contained no specific recommendations about how to best implement that policy.  The 
Air Force turned to the scientific and academic community for recommendations on how 
to proceed.17  Two reports about air defense were subsequently issued by study groups 
located at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that would have a dramatic impact on 
continental air defenses.   
The first of these was the Project Charles report issued in August 1951 which 
established two foundational principles which were the basis of all subsequent continental 
air defense projects in the 1950s.  The first of these principles was the recognition of the 
valuable, possibly decisive, effect that tactical early warning could provide to the U.S.  The 
report was the first to recognize the value of a distant early warning system that could 
provide two to six addition hours of warning of Soviet bombers approaching along 
transpolar routes.  Because this additional time could mean the difference between the 
survival of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or its destruction on the ground, the committee 
considered such a distant early warning system across the Arctic region of North America 
highly desirable.  However, Project Charles’ members thought such a system was not 
feasible; in addition to the difficulty of construction, operation and supply in such a 
remote, forbidding location, the unpredictable electromagnetic conditions of the Arctic 
                                                          
17
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1961), 328-29. 
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regions would make radio communications highly unreliable.  However, the Project Charles 
report endorsed the extension of radar coverage north of the border into Canada.18   
The scientists and academics of Project Charles were not the first to see the value of 
extending radar coverage north of the U.S.-Canadian border, and significant dialogue 
between the U.S. and Canada on this problem had been ongoing since the formation of the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defense in 1940.  As the U.S. began to construct a radar network 
for its air defense system, the defensive disadvantages of U.S. geography became 
apparent.  Many of the U.S. centers of industry were very close to the U.S.-Canadian 
border, giving U.S. air defense forces only minutes warning of incoming Soviet bombers in 
the event of an attack.  At the same time, the Canadians had a very spotty system of radar 
coverage; by 1950, only four or five radar stations were built or programmed for 
construction in all of Canada.  The Canadians were reluctant to spend more money on a 
radar network because it lacked the number of interceptors to defend the expanded 
coverage and could not afford both more radar sites and more interceptors. The realities of 
the air defense problem of North America required the U.S. and Canada to cooperate.  
Canada would not be capable of creating an effective air defense system without American 
resources, and the close proximity of major U.S. centers of population and industry meant 
that the U.S. would be incapable of mounting an effective air defense without the 
advantages that Canadian geography could provide.19  Because the needs of providing 
                                                          
18
 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 61-62. 
19
 Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 251.; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 50.; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1952-54 [after abbreviated as FRUS], National Security Affairs II, Part I, “Report of the Special 
Evaulation Subcommittee”: 332-34. 
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basic radar coverage for interceptor control over Canada  corresponded closely with the 
U.S. desire to extend its early warning coverage northward, the U.S. agreed to pay for 
roughly two-thirds of a total network of thirty-two stations of the radar line along the U.S.-
Canada border that would come to be known as the Pinetree Line.20  These radars provided 
both early warning of air raids and ground-controlled intercept (GCI) direction for 
interceptor aircraft and became operational in 1954.21   
                                                          
20
 “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force,” dated March 14, 1951, Folder 17, Records of 
International Military Agencies, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States Section, Top Secret 
Correspondence, 1941-1956, RG 333, Box 3, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland; also “Memorandum 
for the Record: Extended Radar System in Canada,” dated March 12, 1951, same location; also Jockel, No 
Boundaries Upstairs, 44-45. 
21
 Jockel, The Emerging Shield, 210. 
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Figure 3 Map of the Pinetree Line, Mid-Canada Line and the DEW Line (http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vol10/no2/07-
fawcett-eng.asp) 
In the early 1950s the Canadian government began efforts to extend the warning 
time available to its air own defenses, beginning with construction of an early warning line 
across Canada at the 55th parallel.  The Mid-Canada Line (sometimes known as the McGill 
Fence, after the university where the technology was developed) only provided notification 
that something had flown overhead, along with the speed of the object; the Mid-Canada 
20 
 
 
 
Line’s radar system could not provide additional tracking information, such as exact course, 
heading, and altitude.22 
The second major principle established by Project Charles was the use of 
automation provided by digital computers to help manage the defensive air battle over 
North America.   Although non-automated interceptor control had been sufficient during 
the Second World War for both the U.S. and British, the higher speed of post-war jet-
powered bombers meant that an air battle could develop faster than human intercept 
controllers could effectively manage.  In addition, nuclear bombs meant that a single 
bomber could devastate a city or a military base, so a successful defensive air battle 
required an interception rate as close to 100 percent as possible.   Air Force leaders had 
begun to recognize the advantages of automating air defense functions and minimizing 
human involvement in the air defense control system as early as April 1947 and suggested 
that automation might be necessary for the successful intercept of high-speed aircraft a 
year later.23   Project Charles indicated that the best way to improve continental air 
defense was to improve the ability to track and plot the air battle through computerization.  
The work of Project Charles ultimately led to the development and deployment of 
computerized command and control systems such as the Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment (SAGE) and Back-up Interceptor Control (BUIC), which would help direct the 
combined interceptor force in the event of an attack.24  The concept behind SAGE was 
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 Ibid., 66; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 210. 
23
 Redmond and Smith, From Mitre to Whirlwind, 13. 
24
 Daniel C. Dose, NORAD: A New Look, (Kingston, ON, Center for International Relations), 5-6. 
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simple: all of the radar tracks of incoming targets would be fed into the nationwide SAGE 
system that would automatically compile the information and present human operators 
with a tactical picture of the ongoing defensive air battle via a visual display.  The 
controllers could then select which assets would be used to destroy the incoming aircraft.  
In some cases, these aircraft—namely F-102 and F-106 interceptors—could be 
automatically guided into firing position by the SAGE computers.  Theoretically, this system 
would effectively unify the command and control of all U.S. interceptor forces.25  In 
practice, SAGE had several limitations, many of which stemmed from the inability for early 
computers to replicate adequately all of the human functions their designers sought to 
replace.  In addition, the system was vulnerable to jamming, and it probably would have 
failed under actual combat conditions.26 
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 Friedman, Network-Centric Warfare, 72-73 
26 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 105-107; Paul J. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 11-12. 
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Chapter 6.  The 1952 Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group 
In 1952, MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group convened with a goal of 
improving continental air defenses.  Chaired by the MIT’s J.R. Zacharias and consisting of a 
broad group of representatives from industry, academia (including J. Robert Oppenheimer) 
and the armed services of both the U.S. and Canada, this informal group met over the 
summer of 1952 to discuss the problem of continental air defense. The report generated by 
those meetings was a remarkable document, showing that the Summer Study Group 
understood not only the strategic dilemma of continental air defense in the nuclear age but 
also the strategic geography of North America and the implications new and emerging 
radar detection, communication and weapon technologies.  Ultimately, the Study Group’s 
report would result in the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, a massive system 
of early warning radars located in the Alaskan and Canadian High Arctic.  Although this 
report articulated the problems of North American air defense very well and proposed 
solutions to those problems, the final implementation of the DEW Line would instead 
reflect a different set of priorities as demanded by the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. 
The Summer Study Group began their report with a stark assessment of the 
potential threat that a nuclear-armed Soviet Union equipped with intercontinental 
bombers represented.  The report estimated that 20 atomic bombs dropped on certain 
population centers in the Northeast would result in over ten million deaths, and that a 
hundred atomic bombs dropped on population centers would result in an estimated 
twenty million deaths.  Apart from the massive suffering such an attack would cause, the 
23 
 
 
 
deaths of millions of industrial workers would threaten the nation’s ability to fight and win 
a general war.27  A single successful raid could overcome the strategic advantage provided 
by geography and deprive the U.S. of both the workers and the industrial base required to 
fight a long war.  Moreover, the Summer Study Group concluded that the Soviet Union 
would soon have the ability to deliver such a crippling blow to the United States, that the 
U.S. did not have the defensive capability to defend against such an attack, and that 
mounting a defense was possible if the U.S. was willing to create such a defense on a scale 
that had not yet been considered.  The most important task of such a defense was to 
prevent tactical surprise.28  
To prevent such a surprise, the Summer Study Group recommended the 
construction of a Distant Early Warning System.  Such a system would provide early 
warning of a Soviet nuclear attack and would allow SAC to launch its bomber and tanker 
forces and begin its retaliatory strike.  Early warning would also alert Air Defense Command 
and allow the early activation of its defenses.  The four-to-six hours of warning provided 
meant that both interceptor forces and fixed defenses on the ground (such as missiles and 
anti-aircraft artillery) could be brought to full alert.  This warning would maximize their 
mission effectiveness by allowing them to stand up only during alerts and would make 
defense forces more affordable by only activating them when needed.   In addition to 
mobilizing active defenses, passive defensive measures could also be implemented.  Civil 
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air traffic could be brought under strict control, minimizing any confusion due to 
unidentified but harmless civil aviation.  The Control of Electronic Radiation (CONELRAD) 
could be implemented in the hope of depriving Soviet bombers of navigation information 
gained from civilian and military radio use.  Naval and merchant shipping could be cleared 
from harbors, and civil defense could be activated. 29   
The United States needed to erect a workable defense against long-range bombers, 
and the report identified early warning as the key to such a defense.  The Study Group 
report called for: 
“*a+n alert zone of two or more alerting lines with supporting “fill in” developed as time 
permits.  The most distant of these lines should be 2000 miles or more from our boundaries 
and provide 3 to 6 hours’ warning.  Such a zone can be made effective against aircraft at 
any feasible altitude.  This distant early warning (DEW) zone is fundamental to all effective 
military and civil defense measures...”30 
This Distant Early Warning zone would be 200-400 miles deep and would use land-based 
radars with airborne backup.  The northernmost line would run along the north shore of 
North America, extending to Greenland and possibly connecting to a European-based 
warning net.  The second line would diverge from the first and eventually connect to 
existing Pinetree Line radar stations in Newfoundland.  The logistical difficulties of the 
remote location would be minimized through the use of technology.  By equipping the 
stations with automatic signal processing, crews would no longer have to constantly stare 
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at radar scopes, vigilant for any intrusion. Computers would automatically process radar 
signal returns, alerting crews with an audible alarm if the radars detected a possible 
airspace intrusion.  In addition, the report called for anti-spoofing equipment to be used to 
minimize the effectiveness of Soviet jamming and other electronic warfare support. The 
seaward edge of the line would be extended by using Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 
aircraft to cover the sea approaches from Alaska to Hawaii, backed up with picket ships 
also equipped with audible-presentation radar.  Finally, existing tropospheric-scatter 
technology, which used radio waves refracted through the troposphere to extend the 
range of signals hundreds of miles, would provide long-distance communications. The 
group suggested placing priority on the quick installation of the DEW Line Number One (the 
northernmost line).  Furthermore, the report stated that technological development should 
focus not only on radar and communications technologies, but also on technologies 
necessary for the data-gathering and intercept portions of the system.31 
” A distant warning zone that properly exploits our geographic position makes 
possible measures not now considered in our defense planning [original emphasis].  It 
appears technically feasible, for example, to establish an airborne data-gathering net 
which, on receiving warning, will track the attack well in advance of its contact with the 
defense perimeter.  Once this kind of tracking data is available, the possibility of 
concentrating mobile defense forces, over and above present fixed defenses, can be 
considered.  The Study Group did not reach definite conclusions concerning the economics 
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of such mobile defenses.  This phase of the problem deserves continuous and intensive 
study.”32 
The report recommended that the Outer DEW Line start construction as quickly as 
possible, preferably in the spring of 1953. 33 
The Summer Study Group understood that early warning alone was insufficient to 
realize the full potential of the DEW system.  This system had to connect with the existing 
portions of the continental air defense and provide it with useful information to maximize 
the effectiveness of the defensive air battle.  The report called for 
“…an information and tracking zone that can be erected operationally upon advice 
from the DEW zone.  Upon acquisition of the enemy by this zone, information within it 
should be relatively continuous, though the information zone need not necessarily be 
contiguous with the alert zone (see Chap. 5).” 34 
The Study Group Report referred to this vast space between the DEW zone and the 
detection and tracking radars of southern Canada and the U.S. as the “Data Zone”, which 
gathered data about raid strength, speed and direction.  Erecting any sort of ground-based 
system in this region was very difficult, and the report pointed out that the DEW stations, 
which were located by the sea, were easier to reach than the vast interior of the Canadian 
Arctic.  (The Mid-Canada Line, located along the 55th parallel, roughly marked the northern 
limit of the Canadian railroad system.)  Although a detailed solution to the Data Zone 
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problem was not found, the Study Group report suggested that tracking could be 
accomplished by AEW aircraft operating together to provide both radar coverage 
throughout the Data Zone and line-of-sight communications between aircraft and ground 
command centers.  The barrier formed by these aircraft could be “erected operationally,” 
i.e., launched during an alert from appropriately located airfields.  Five aircraft would form 
a single data unit one thousand miles across, and five of these data units would provide 
coverage throughout the data zone in northern Canada. A further two more data units 
would provide data zone coverage for the seaward extensions of the DEW Line.35  Tracking 
and other raid information collected in the data zone would minimize the effectiveness of 
enemy tactics by providing tracking and other raid information and allowing interceptor 
forces to concentrate on appropriate areas for maximum effectiveness.  In addition to the 
requirement that coverage within the data zone be contiguous, that coverage needed to be 
contiguous with the zone of interception as well.36    
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Figure 4 Map of Data Zone as proposed in the Summer Study Group Report 
The report identified concerns about an early warning system like the DEW Line.   
Enemy countermeasures were a major concern, and one of the main benefits of a land-
based DEW zone likely backed up by an airborne data-gathering zone was the system’s 
reduced vulnerability to enemy action.  The Summer Study Group stressed the entire 
system had to be flexible and resilient to function under the stresses of an actual enemy 
attack.37  The senior USAF leadership was initially reluctant to support the DEW System 
proposal because they felt that it was the first step in an air defense system that would 
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reduce the need for the deterrent provided by SAC and drain funds away from the Air 
Force.38  Critics from the Air Force and elsewhere  often articulated comparisons of the 
DEW Line with the Maginot Line—the system of French fortifications that were easily 
bypassed by the Germans in 1940—arguing that the DEW Line would foster a “Maginot 
Line mentality”.  The report specifically addressed the criticism that the DEW Line and its 
defensive cohorts were akin to the Maginot Line.  It argued that a ‘Maginot Line mentality” 
is one that relied excessively on a single weapon system, and the chief failure of the 
Maginot Line was the failure to back up the defensive system of fortifications with 
adequate offensive systems.  The report went on to state that relying on SAC offensive 
forces could result in scenarios in which the U.S. would be vulnerable, such as a preemptive 
strike by the Soviets or the construction of a DEW-like system in the Soviet Union.39 
Despite this reasoning, the immediate reaction of the U.S. defense establishment to 
the Summer Study Group’s proposal was overwhelmingly negative, and the report initially 
wasn’t able to find a suitable party to bring it before the National Security Council for 
consideration.40  The Army, Air Force, and Navy, along with the Rand Corporation, felt that 
such a line would have gaps in radar coverage, would be vulnerable to deception measures, 
and would be too far away from fighter cover to be effective.41  At the same time, the Air 
Force had earlier expressed its willingness to support a four-site test bed project to prove 
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the involved technologies.42  The Air Force likely supported such a cautious approach in 
order to slow down the project, thereby keeping appropriation dollars flowing to SAC.  If 
so, the effort was successful; although the DEW Line project would be approved and 
funded, the initial effort would be limited to the test project while the concept was further 
developed.43 
 The Summer Study Group Report issued their report at a time of reformulation of 
American defense policy.  On October 30, 1953, the National Security Council issued NSC-
162/2, which laid out the national security policy of the Eisenhower Administration.  The 
following December a defense program was approved that, in addition to ensuring SAC’s 
massive retaliation capability and approving the development of tactical nuclear weapons, 
called for defenses to be erected that would defend the country and its ability to retaliate.  
Over the next seven years the U.S. would build defensive systems meant to detect and 
intercept Soviet bombers and submarines, and create survivable command posts to ensure 
continuity-of-government.  Among these systems were SAGE; the U.S. Navy’s Sound 
Surveillance System (SOSUS) for detecting Soviet submarines; the Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System (BMEWS) and Missile Detection Alarm System (MIDAS) for detecting ICBM 
launches, and the Distant Early Warning Line.44 
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Chapter 7.  The DEW Line 
Feasibility testing for the DEW Line started with a single site on Barter Island, Alaska 
in early 1953.  Construction of an eighteen-site string of test sites on a stretch of coast in 
northeastern Alaska and northwestern Canada started in July 1953.  By 1954, the U.S. Air 
Force felt that the feasibility of the technologies involved had been proven, and the 
Canadian government agreed to the DEW Line in principle in a diplomatic note.  The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff consented to the construction of the DEW Line in 1955, and a formal U.S.-
Canadian agreement was signed in May 1955.  Construction of the fifty-seven stations of 
the basic system stretching from Alaska to Baffin Island took place between 1955 and 1957.  
Because Canada had paid for the entire cost of the Mid-Canada Line, it felt justified in 
asking the U.S. to foot the entire bill for the much more expensive DEW Line.45 
A committee composed of U.S. and Canadian military personnel and the Western 
Electric contractors who were building the DEW Line known as the Location Study Group 
determined the location of the system’s radar stations.  The desire by some of the involved 
parties to move the locations of the radar sites southward to ease construction and 
logistical burdens, which first appeared very early in the planning process46, was still 
evident.  Despite this southward pull, both the Location Study Group and the Canadian 
government desired to position the DEW Line as far north as possible.  The Location Study 
Group placed a priority on maximizing the warning time provided by the radar line, while 
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the Canadians did not wish to sacrifice the warning time for their cities for the sake of U.S. 
contractors.47  
Although the original Summer Study Group proposal had called for two lines of 
radars across the Arctic, only one of these lines was constructed.  There is no information 
in the available documentary and archival sources that explains the omission of the second 
line. Although there is evidence that a second DEW Line was still in consideration after the 
Summer Study Group’s report48, the proposal for the second DEW line seems to have just 
disappeared.49  Although there is no documentary evidence that specifies exactly the 
reason for the omission of the second line, it is likely that it happened during the location 
planning process.  Three reasons for this action suggest themselves.  First, defense 
planners felt that the DEW Line as constructed adequately served the purpose of activating 
the U.S. nuclear retaliation in the event of a Soviet first strike, and this capability both 
fulfilled the early warning function that both Project Charles and the Summer Study Group 
identified as critical to the protection of the nuclear deterrent.  This would represent an 
institutional compromise between those in the defense establishment who felt that SAC 
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nuclear deterrent was the only reliable defense, and those who wished to construct a 
comprehensive continental air defense.  Secondly, the increasing number of Soviet nuclear 
weapons caused defense planners in the U.S. and Canada to reconsider the value of 
defensive systems designed to help defeat Soviet nuclear forces versus systems designed 
to enhance the deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  Third, although an operational 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability was still thought to be years away, 
defense planners may have understood the implications of such a capability on continental 
air defenses.  The DEW Line could not detect or contribute to a defense against ICBMs or 
their cousins, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  Although the original DEW 
Line proposal would have greatly improved continental air defenses, that improvement 
alone did not have the same value to U.S. defenses in the face of new delivery 
technologies. 
The original DEW Line was composed of six main stations, twenty-three auxiliary 
stations, and twenty-eight intermediate stations divided into six sectors, with one main 
station and whatever combination of auxiliary and intermediate stations needed to create 
a seamless band of radar coverage.  Detection was accomplished with two different radar 
systems.  The main and auxiliary stations were equipped with dual-beam radar systems, 
with both beams operating back-to-back as they were mechanically scanned within a 
protective radome.  Intermediate stations using Doppler systems covered any low-altitude 
gaps between the main and auxiliary stations.  This technology was similar to that used on 
the Mid-Canada Line, and although the intermediate stations provided indication of an 
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object passing overhead, they offered little other information that could be used to 
determine the course, speed, or direction of an unidentified contact.  The U.S. deactivated 
the intermediate stations when the other radar systems appeared to be adequate for the 
task of providing early warning.50  
Tropospheric-scatter communication systems provided communication, and could 
transfer radar detection and other data to the nearest main station using voice and 
teletype formats.  Each main station had a data center that would evaluate radar contacts 
and pass the information to Air Defense Command (later NORAD) as deemed necessary.51  
The original DEW Line plan called for lateral communications between stations to be 
provided by the Tropospheric Scatter Communications System, which had a range of about 
100 miles.  An Ionospheric Scatter Communications System would link the main stations 
and higher command headquarters.   However, advances in reliability and capacity made 
the tropospheric scatter system much more attractive, particularly in light of the heavier 
demands placed on the system after the deployment of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
System (BMEWS), with which it shared a communication system.  As a result, the U.S. 
deactivated the ionospheric scatter systems and used tropospheric scatter systems in their 
place.52  Additionally, AM radios provided emergency backup communications, although 
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the radios could be used by licensed Ham radio operators when not needed for operational 
purposes.53 
The DEW Line was in an extremely isolated and unprotected location.  In spite of 
airstrips, the vast majority of logistical support occurred annually between late June and 
early September using primarily sea transportation in the Annual Sealift/Airlift Resupply.54  
In addition to this isolation, there was no provision against any sort of armed attack.  
Although the DEW Line’s communications rearward had some built-in redundancy, a given 
sector of the line could be cut off from the rest of the network by severing communications 
in as few as two places.  Although the Summer Study Group report recognized these 
vulnerabilities, they did not see them as a threatening the tactical warning function of the 
DEW Line since the destruction of any portion of the line would itself constitute a tactical 
warning.55 
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Chapter 8.  The DEW Line: An Analysis 
The DEW Line as constructed differed in two important aspects to the DEW System 
proposed by the Lincoln Laboratory.  First, only one of the two proposed lines was built, 
although the eastern portion of the northern DEW Line was built further south than the 
Summer Study Group had proposed.  Secondly, the data zone portion of the DEW System 
composed of AEW aircraft was never constructed.  The absence of the data zone shifted 
the function of the DEW Line in important ways. 
 Planning for the air defense of North America against nuclear bombers with 
intercontinental range was fundamentally different from previous air defense battles.  
These differences, including geography, speed of the aircraft, and the ability for a single 
nuclear-armed bomber to do the work of thousands of conventionally armed bombers, 
created certain requirements for the continental air defense system.  As constructed, the 
DEW Line only partially met those requirements.  The system that was actually built quietly 
emphasized the trip-wire function that was seen by many to be essential for the 
effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent.  This emphasis would dramatically reduce the value 
of the DEW Line’s air defense function and put the effectiveness of the entire continental 
air defense system into question. 
The Second World War gave defense planners plenty of experience with defensive 
air battles.  Two models of such battles stand out: the Battle of Britain and the numerous 
defensive battles fought around the U.S. carrier forces against the Japanese in the Pacific.  
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However, there are important differences between a continental air defense battle and 
these historical precedents. 
The first of these differences was the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.  During 
the Battle of Britain, the bomb load of an individual bomber would have to be delivered 
many times in order to achieve a strategically relevant result.  Air commanders 
compensated for this fact with raids consisting of hundreds of bombers aimed at a single 
target.  In these conditions, successful destruction of 10 percent of a raid would be 
considered a success because the destroyed aircraft would not be available for later raids.   
On the other hand, nuclear weapons made large raids on single targets unnecessary.  
Theoretically, a single bomber armed with a nuclear weapon of sufficient yield could 
destroy any single target, and a raid by a handful of nuclear-armed bombers would virtually 
guarantee the target’s destruction.  An interception rate of 10 percent against such a raid 
was no longer acceptable, since even a single successful bomber could devastate its target. 
The second of the major differences was one of dimensionality.  The tactical 
problem confronting any air defense exists in two basic dimensions: time and space.  A 
successful intercept requires that the defenders detect an incoming raid with enough time 
to intercept the incoming aircraft with defensive weapons before the intruder can strike its 
target.  In an air defense scenario, time is a function of distance, and early warning sensors 
such as radar derive their effectiveness by their ability to detect intruders at greater 
distances than the human eye or ear.  However, early warning alone does not provide 
sufficient information to carry out a successful intercept.   The location, course and speed 
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of the intruder must be determined with enough accuracy to guide an interceptor to within 
weapons range.  This information is the basis for the spatial requirement of a successful 
intercept. 
The air defense battles of World War Two were dominated by the dimension of 
time, primarily because the relatively compact nature of the battlespace they were fought 
over minimized the relevance of space.  The operational distances for the Luftwaffe were 
short: some targets in southern England were only 100 miles from bases in northern 
France, and even targets in Scotland and northern England were only about 500 miles from 
the farthest bases in southern Norway.   The Royal Air Force fighter aircraft used for 
interception were well-dispersed across Britain, and although machine-gun armament of 
those aircraft required that the interception take place at visual range, the speed of the 
aircraft in proportion to the size of the battlespace meant that the requisite numbers of 
interceptors could be quickly concentrated to make the interception; the trick was doing so 
before the German bombers struck their targets.   This early detection was accomplished 
using Britain’s Chain Home radar system. 
The carrier air battles of the Pacific functioned in a similar manner, although there 
were some important differences.  Because aircraft carriers could move, the dimension of 
space was a tactical variable in the battles, requiring both hostile strike aircraft and their 
interceptors to find their targets.  As the war progressed, radar would play a greater role in 
raid detection, reducing this variable.  Nonetheless, the basic dynamic remained the same 
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despite the tactical variable of aircraft carrier mobility: once radar detected enemy aircraft, 
the trick was to intercept them before they could strike their targets. 
The continental air defense of North America differed fundamentally from both 
World War Two models because the dimension of space was equally as important as the 
dimension of time.  Although both the Battle of Britain and the carrier battles of the Pacific 
could take place over two hundred thousand square miles, the area of Canada alone was 
almost four million square miles.  The distances involved—especially along the east-west 
axis—and the speed and range of both the incoming Soviet bombers and the intercepting 
aircraft meant that defensive aircraft from across the perimeter might not be able to 
concentrate sufficiently to successfully intercept the incoming aircraft unless supplied with 
both adequate warning time and pre-intercept tracking of the target.  For example, a 
defensive air battle to protect New York State could not utilize interceptor aircraft assigned 
to the Pacific Northwest or even much of the Upper Midwest unless there was both early 
warning and tracking of the raid as they travelled southward across Canada. 
The 1952 Summer Study Group understood this basic fact of strategic geography, 
and the DEW System they recommended was designed to handle both the temporal and 
spatial dimensions of the air battle.  The extreme northern location of the DEW Line early 
warning radars would provide at least three to six hours of warning before Soviet bombers 
travelling at high-subsonic speeds could transit the polar region and reach their targets 
over southern Canada or the United States.  After this initial early warning, the early 
warning aircraft of the data zone would provide additional information, including raid 
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strength, course and speed.  Although radar coverage of the data zone’s AEW aircraft may 
not have been contiguous with the interception zone’s coverage provided by the Mid-
Canada and Pinetree Lines, even intermittent tracking provided by the data zone would 
allow air defenses to plot an appropriate response.  The data zone was supposed to allow 
the U.S. and Canada to operate effectively in the spatial dimension of the defensive air 
battle over North America. 
However, the data zone recommended by the Summer Study Group was not 
implemented in the construction of the DEW Line.  As a result, nearly a thousand linear 
miles of uncovered airspace existed between the DEW Line along the 69th parallel and the 
beginning of coverage of southern Canada provided by the Mid-Canada Line at the 55th 
parallel.  The existence of this gap in radar coverage was a serious deficiency in continental 
air defense.  In addition to the absence of tracking information across this zone, the gap 
would allow incoming bombers to make significant changes in course, perhaps even 
executing a lateral transit across the breadth of Canadian airspace.  This gap in coverage 
presented opportunities for feints or other deceptive tactics to displace or otherwise 
diminish the effectiveness of air defenses, allowing incoming Soviet bombers to exploit the 
vast spaces of northern Canada for tactical advantage.  In short, the DEW Line without a 
data zone put at risk the ability to manage the special dimension of the air defense battle; 
it was little more than a tripwire, and it would have provided little more than warning. 
The data zone proposed by the Summer Study Group would have minimized this 
defensive problem by providing continuous information on the location, speed, and 
41 
 
 
 
heading of the raid, as well as other information such as the number of aircraft.  As the raid 
passed through the Data Zone, interceptors could be launched and concentrated to destroy 
the raid.  As Soviet bombers flying from bases in Siberia crossed from the data zone into 
the northern reaches of the intercept zone, they would find themselves confronted by U.S. 
or Canadian interceptors. 
Although the missing data zone left open a large hole in the coverage of Canada, 
that hole would not have existed across the entire northern perimeter of North America.  
Bombers transiting Alaska would run into the defensive radars and aircraft of Alaskan Air 
Command.  Likewise, bombers penetrating Canadian airspace over eastern Newfoundland 
would encounter U.S. and Canadian air defenses.  However, the Soviet Union knew about 
the existence of these defenses and would likely direct bombers through less-defended 
territory as a result.  A vast portion of central Canada did not have such defenses, and 
bombers penetrating that airspace could head toward any part of the U.S. or Canada.  In 
addition, the seaward extensions of the DEW Line also did not have data zones, 
complicating the defensive task in those areas. 
There is no mention of the data zone in the available evidence after the initial 
Summer Study Group report.  However, there were several instances of discussion about 
the difficulties imposed by the lack of tracking capability south of the DEW Line.  The first 
such mention was during a meeting that took place on December 7, 1952 between the 
Canadian Defense Research Board, members of the Lincoln Laboratory, and military 
personnel from both the U.S. and Canada.  The group highlighted difficulties imposed by a 
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lack of tracking information south of the DEW Line was highlighted as a main concern, 
although it made no mention of neither the data zone nor its constituent AEW aircraft.  The 
data zone proposal seems to have fallen out of consideration in the four months after the 
Summer Study Group report.  This meeting was also the last mention of the second, 
southern DEW Line.  It is likely that the proposal for the second DEW Line was simply 
folded into the northernmost DEW Line.  However, no such explanation is suggested for 
the lack of the Data Zone, the disappearance of which seems all the more unusual in light 
of discussion about tracking concerns it was meant to remedy.56  A similar set of concerns 
were evident in a memorandum of a conversation by Carlton Savage of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, in which military leaders expressed reservation about 
the Summer Study Group’s proposal on the grounds (among others) that the proposed line 
would be easy to spoof and that the 70th parallel would be too far north to effectively 
control interceptor aircraft based further south.  Again, no mention is made of the data 
zone.57 
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Chapter 9.  Rising Doubts 
The DEW Line became operational in August 1957.  Two months later the Soviets 
launched Sputnik, and the world woke up to the possibilities of rocket technology and the 
potential threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).  The implication of the launch 
was that a deployable ICBM was not a distant dream for the Soviets but rather an 
immediate prospect.  The half-hour flight time of a hypothetical Soviet ICBM triggered 
immediate questions about the survivability of the U.S. deterrent and the usefulness of 
existing early warning systems.   
The looming prospect of operational Soviet ICBMs caused a noticeable shift in the 
nuclear calculus of the U.S., and doubts began to emerge about the effectiveness and 
usefulness of the DEW Line’s air defense and tactical warning functions.  The DEW Line 
radars had no value against ICBMs and could not be used to issue tactical warning of an 
Soviet ICBM strike.  Unlike modern electronically-scanned phased-array ICBM detection 
radars, the mechanically-scanned DEW Line could be overflown by ICBMs.  Since the launch 
locations were deep inside the Soviet Union, Soviet ICBMs would be boosted out of the 
atmosphere outside of detection range and pass over the DEW Line on their way to their 
targets in the US and Canada.58   
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Although predicted well in advance by the Eisenhower Administration, the 
successful launch of Sputnik shocked the American public in many ways and prompted 
many questions about existing and future U.S. technological capabilities.  Among the many 
government responses to this crisis was the creation of new government bodies such as 
the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which advised President Eisenhower 
on how to close the gap perceived between American science and technology and that of 
the Soviets. Like the Lincoln Laboratory, PSAC focused on technical aspects of defense 
requirements, and although their mission may have led them to take contrarian views on 
air defense subjects, their findings are consistent with the state of air defense technologies 
at the time.59  Their reviews cast doubt on the efficacy of existing early warning and air 
defense systems.  A report of a PSAC Ad Hoc Panel on Continental Air Defense meeting to 
assess continental air defense stated that existing early warning systems (presumably 
including DEW) “appear effective enough to provide reasonable assurance of warning 
against a mass bomber attack.”   However, the systems were not adequate to assure 
detection of a small number of bombers penetrating at low altitude.  This inadequacy 
indicated the possibility of a small sneak attack destroying U.S. retaliatory forces before a 
larger force delivered a devastating blow to the U.S.  Importantly, the report also stated 
that a system did not exist to indicate that such a sneak attack by the Soviet Union was 
underway, although the Air Force was constructing a bomb-alarm system that would be 
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completed in January 1960.60  The same report described the continental air defense 
system as “weak because it is only partially operative.”  As examples, the report mentioned 
“data handling, data processing and control system is still largely manually operated.”  And 
although the air defense system “can be expected to perform reasonably well against 
medium and high-altitude mass attack in a non-ECM environment,” its effectiveness 
“varies continually in a completely unpredictable manner”.  These variations could be 
solved through improved doctrine and training.  Even so, the “existing Air Defense System… 
even in the absence of ECM” was “incapable of effective performance against low-altitude 
attack.  From the viewpoint of active defense, it is apparent that the low-level radar 
coverage (i.e., altitudes below 5,000 feet) is essentially worthless.”  If a raid was 
accompanied by a “determined ECM effort,” the system’s performance was degraded by as 
much as half.61   
Another PSAC report was more specific in its criticism.  It discussed the results of 
Exercise Top Hand conducted in September 1958 by the North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD) and SAC as a test of the various early warning systems—including the 
DEW Line, Mid-Canada Line, and the barriers over the Atlantic and Pacific—as well as to 
evaluate the air defense system effectiveness.  The test was supposed to be a no-notice 
test, although the report stated that the surprise nature of the test had been compromised 
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in a variety of ways.  Even so, the test results were disturbing.  Although the early warning 
lines’ ability to detect high-flying aircraft was good, the raid information they produced was 
of dubious value.  The portion of the report merits quoting at length:  
“Raid assessment by the individual early warning lines was inadequate.  The analysis 
indicated that it was highly doubtful that raid assessment by individual lines was good 
enough to justify committing the interceptor forces on the basis of their information.  
(Estimates of the numbers of aircraft varied from about 80 per cent high to 50 per cent 
low.)  The analysts point out that in attempting to plan interceptor commitment prior to 
penetration of the land-based contiguous cover, the ability to estimate correctly what was 
coming in terms of numbers, speeds and altitudes and from various directions was 
important and that the early warning lines did not provide such estimates accurately. 
*original emphasis+”62 
Another NORAD exercise held in October 1958, codenamed Exercise Desk Top, came to 
similar conclusions.  After simulating conditions of an actual attack, the exercise 
determined that NORAD Systems (presumably including SAGE) were overloaded with 
unclassified aircraft tracks, that discrepancies in the radar systems led to duplicate tracks, 
and that the time necessary to activate “engineered circuits” was too long to ensure their 
availability in an actual surprise attack.  The exercise report also noted that the 
assumptions of the exercise were optimistic and “did not, in any way, approximate the true 
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situation.”63  Friedman has noted that although SAGE proved the concept of computerized 
air defense, the SAGE system design unreliable in part because of its vacuum-tube design.  
A successful naval combat-direction computer system, the Naval Tactical Data System, 
served a function similar to SAGE but used solid-state component; the U.S. Navy did not 
complete development and begin to deploy the system until the early 1960s.64 
 Among the main fears that these and other tests created was that the U.S nuclear 
deterrent—the preservation of which had been one of the original goals of the DEW Line—
would be vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack.  Because of the central role the deterrent 
played in national security policy, the Air Force initiated urgent efforts to remedy the 
problem.  Since the existing early warning systems seemed inadequate to the task, several 
other options for ensuring preservation of the deterrent were explored.  One result of 
these efforts was the creation of additional sensors for detecting both incoming and 
ongoing Soviet nuclear strikes.  Efforts to create the SOSUS system to detect Soviet 
submarines (and therefore help prevent a surprise nuclear attack using submarine-based 
weapons) had been underway since the early 1950s.65  Although the Soviet Union would 
not deploy ICBMs until the early 1960s, no existing radar line had the capability to detect 
Soviet ICBMs except in the terminal seconds of flight.  As a result, the Air Force initiated the 
research and development of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.  A nuclear 
detonation detection system, which would alert air defense forces if a Soviet nuclear attack 
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was already underway, and programs to use satellite-based infrared detection of ICBM 
launches were also proposed and quickly approved.66  The U.S. launched the first satellite-
based launch detection system, the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS), beginning in 
1960.  In 1963, the U.S. also started launching the Vela satellite constellation.  Though 
ostensibly intended to monitor Soviet compliance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Vela 
satellites also functioned as a nuclear detonation detection system.67 
  At the same time, the U.S. either did not approve or did not expand several 
initiatives to protect the deterrent by passive measures.  Although U.S. ICBMs would 
eventually be stored in hardened underground silos, proposals to do the same for the U.S. 
bomber force were not adopted.  Air Force planners also rejected expansion of SAC 
airborne alert force, which sought to prevent the destruction of the U.S. deterrent by 
keeping bombers aloft at all times, on the basis that the expense of the airborne alert could 
be more usefully invested in sensors such as BMEWS.68   
As the diversification and reliability of early warning sensors improved, the 
perceived need to protect the deterrent forces diminished, reflecting an enhanced trust by 
U.S. policymakers in the early warning system.  Although the early warning and air defense 
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Name of System Date First Deployed Location Purpose 
Lashup 1948 Northeastern U.S., 
Southern California, 
Great Lakes region, 
nuclear production 
facilities in Washington 
State, Tennessee and 
New Mexico 
Detection and Ground-
Controlled Intercept 
(GCI) 
Permanent 1949 Throughout 
Continental United 
States and Alaska 
Detection and GCI  
Pinetree Line 1952-54 U.S. and Canada along 
50th parallel, 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador coast 
Early warning, 
detection and GCI 
Mid-Canada Line (aka 
McGill Fence) 
1953-1957 Across Canada along 
55th parallel 
Early warning 
Distant Early Warning 
Line (DEW Line) 
1956-1957 Across Alaskan and 
Canadian Arctic along 
70th parallel 
Early warning 
Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment 
(SAGE) 
1959-1963 22 Sector Direction 
Centers in U.S. and 
Canada 
Automatic data fusion 
and GCI 
Sound Surveillance 
System (SOSUS) 
1959 Underwater sensors in 
Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans 
Detection of 
submarines 
Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System 
(BMEWS) 
1959 Clear, Alaska; Thule, 
Greenland; Fylingdales 
Moor, England 
Detection of ICBMs in 
flight 
Missile Defense Alarm 
System (MIDAS) 
1960 orbital Detection of ICBM 
launches 
Vela (Nuclear 
Detonation Detection 
System) 
1963 orbital Worldwide detection 
of nuclear detonations 
Figure 5. U.S. Defensive Systems Deployment 
control systems that resulted from Project Charles and the Lincoln Laboratory’s 1952 
Summer Study Group were built using technology that was then cutting-edge, the 
effectiveness of the whole system rested on the ability of the DEW Line to provide reliable 
early warning.  The failure of this technology in the event of an actual Soviet raid would 
have resulted in the failure to manage the temporal dimension of the air battle, which 
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would also put at risk the ability of SAGE to manage the spatial aspect of the battle.   The 
irony of the ICBM is that while it decreased the warning time of an impending nuclear 
strike to less than a half-hour, it also had distinct ballistic flight and infrared characteristics 
that allowed tactical launch and flight detection through multiple—and therefore 
redundant—sensor technologies.  Space-based sensors can detect the large amounts of 
infrared energy given off by the rocket plume of an ICBM launch.  Ground-based radars can 
also easily distinguish the ballistic path of an ICBM in flight.  Although ICBMs could strike 
with less than a half-hour of warning, the U.S. now had a more reliable system of warning 
to detect an incoming Soviet strike.  Armed with this knowledge, the U.S. now had the 
technological basis to back away from promises of massive retaliation without reducing the 
deterrent value of its nuclear arsenal.
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Chapter 10.  Conclusion  
The end of the age when strategic bombers dominated nuclear war plans was cold 
comfort to millions of Soviet and American citizens.  The fear of swift death by ICBMs that 
was a mere half-hour away augmented the older fear of nuclear bombers.  And unlike air-
breathing bombers, there was no way to stop ICBMs; once launched they could not be 
recalled or destroyed.  The world had added one fear to another.  
Along with this new fear came a new way of organizing for nuclear defense.  With 
multiple sensors for detecting an approaching nuclear attack, such as the DEW Line, 
BMEWS, MIDAS and SOSUS at its disposal, the nation’s confidence in tactical early warning 
improved.  At the same time, NORAD was helpless to defend against ballistic missile attack.  
But it could still defend against bombers, and for that task it still relied on the warning 
provided by the Distant Early Warning Line. The DEW Line came online in 1957 as North 
America’s front-line warning system against attack by Soviet bombers.  The 1952 Summer 
Study Group, in its proposal for the DEW Line, took for granted that Strategic Air 
Command’s nuclear deterrent was defensively oriented and would only strike the Soviet 
Union in response to Soviet aggression.  The role of the DEW Line in such a scenario was to 
sound the alarm and help air defense forces keep defensive air battle as far north as 
possible while allowing U.S. strategic bombers to take off and execute their retaliatory 
mission.  Other systems such as SAGE brought a high-degree of automation in the effort to 
coordinate such an air battle.  Through the use of a robust early warning system combined 
with picture-centric battle management technology, U.S defense planners sought to 
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automate and perfect the air defense systems pioneered by the U.S. Navy and Great Britain 
during World War Two. 
The final design of the DEW Line reflected other priorities and an evolving concept 
of nuclear deterrence.  Paired down from two warning lines and Airborne Early Warning 
aircraft to provide tracking information, the single line that remained was adequate for 
only one operational task: to provide tactical warning of a Soviet attack.  Once this task was 
complete, the DEW Line could provide only information of limited value for the air 
defenses whose task was to intercept and destroy the intruders.  Moreover, the DEW Line 
was built at the limit of existing technology, and its ability to provide warning of a sneak 
attack under operational conditions was open to debate.  Together with similar 
performance reliability questions about SAGE, the resulting system lacked the ability to 
manage either the spatial or temporal dimensions of a defensive air battle, which cast 
doubts on the survivability of the nation’s deterrent.  As a result, the only deterrence that 
the combination of the U.S. air defense system and Strategic Air Command was able to 
provide was pre-emptive deterrence—in which the DEW Line could have no role. 
The limited advantages provided by the DEW Line was not a failure of the DEW Line 
or its designers.  The Lincoln Laboratory’s concept was sound.  And even though the DEW 
Line as built could not contribute to continental air defense as effectively its designers 
promised, it still provided a tripwire that was as effective as then-current technology could 
muster.  The effectiveness of the nation’s deterrent depended not only on the technology 
of the nation’s defenses, but also the planning and procedures required to maximize that 
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technology’s potential.  The DEW Line could never be more effective than the nuclear 
doctrine, plans, and procedures in place to use the warning it provided.  Fortunately, the 
DEW Line was never tested in combat conditions.  The launch of Sputnik and the 
deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles that followed forced needed changes to 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent.  New sensor technologies like MIDAS and BMEWS 
supplemented and partially replaced the DEW Line in its primary warning function, and the 
importance of its air defense role faded as the threat of ICBMs grew.  By the early 1960s 
the DEW Line had become one of several overlapping technological systems designed to 
detect and confirm that a Soviet strike was underway.  The role of the DEW Line in the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent thus shifted away from air defense while maintaining its early warning 
function, which it now shared with other systems.   
By the early 1960s the function of the DEW Line was approximately the same as 
that of its modern descendent, the North Warning System:  to detect airborne intrusion of 
North American airspace.  But the biggest improvement in continental air defense was not 
in the sensor technologies such as the DEW Line or North Warning System or the weapons 
that could be brought to bear on an intruding aircraft.   By doing away with the short-
sighted reliance on a single early warning technology, the U.S. reduced the possibility of a 
successful Soviet surprise attack, as well as its own fear of such an attack.  In this way, the 
switch to multiple early warning technologies helped ensure that the warning they could 
provide would never be needed. 
